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Abstract
This paper provides new evidence on rural-to-urban migration decisions in develop-
ing countries. Using original survey data from rural India, we show that employment
provision on local public works signiﬁcantly reduces seasonal migration. Workers who
choose to participate in the program forgo much higher earnings outside of the village.
Structural estimates imply that the utility cost of one day away may be as high as 60%
of migration earnings. Up to half of this cost can be explained by higher living costs
and income risk. The other half likely reﬂects high non-monetary costs from living and
working in the city.
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1 Introduction
The presence and persistence of large average wage gaps between rural and urban areas
of developing countries is a puzzle for economists. In India, the real wage gap between
rural and urban areas is above 20% and permanent migration between rural and urban
areas is consistently low, around 0.5% per year (Hnatkovska and Lahiri, 2013; Munshi and
Rosenzweig, 2016). One possible explanation for this fact is that mobility frictions prevent
workers from being optimally allocated across sectors, with negative eﬀects on total output
(Gollin et al., 2014; Bryan and Morten, 2015). Another is that the most productive workers
sort into urban areas, so that despite large average wage gaps returns to migrating for the
marginal worker are close to zero (Young, 2013; Hicks et al., 2017).
The study of seasonal migrants, who constantly arbitrage between returns to labor in
rural and urban labor markets can shed light on these issues. In India in 2007-08, over 8.5
million rural adults spent one to six months away from the village to work in urban areas
(National Sample Survey Oﬃce, 2012). Seasonal migrants enjoy signiﬁcant consumption and
income gains by moving to urban areas during the oﬀ-season of agriculture (Bryan et al.,
2014). Also, seasonal migrants do not face the same costs of moving as long-term migrants:
they do not have to sell their land, or lose the support of informal insurance networks (Munshi
and Rosenzweig, 2016). A natural question is then why do not more rural workers migrate
seasonally to work in urban areas.
In this paper, we present unique empirical evidence on the costs and beneﬁts of rural-
to-urban migration. We use original survey data collected by John Papp with Diane Coﬀey
and Dean Spears (Coﬀey et al., 2015) in a high out-migration area located at the border
of three Indian states (Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat). We exploit variation
in employment provision under India's workfare program, the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (NREGA), across seasons and states to shed light on migration decisions.1
The eﬀect of the program on migration is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand it provides
additional income and relaxes cash constraints, which may increase migration (Angelucci,
2015). On the other, it provides local employment opportunities when agricultural work is
scarce, thus oﬀering an alternative to migration (Imbert and Papp, 2016).2
We ﬁnd that availability of NREGA work has a strong negative eﬀect on seasonal migra-
1Workfare programs are income support schemes which provide employment on local public works (Raval-
lion, 1987). Public works programs were active in 94 countries in 2014 (The World Bank, 2015).
2The insurance eﬀects of the program are equally ambiguous. On the one hand, the program reduces
income risk, which may encourage migration (Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016). On the other, it oﬀers an
alternative risk-coping strategy, which may crowd-out distress migration (Morten, 2016).
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tion: in Rajasthan villages, the average adult worked nine more days on local public works
during the summer months and migrated six fewer days. Given that the NREGA wage is
36% lower than earnings outside of the village, the utility costs associated with migration
need to be large for migrants to prefer NREGA work. We estimate a simple structural model
of migration decisions and show that the utility cost of one day away may be as high as 60%
of migration earnings. Using detailed information on migrants' destinations and migration
history, we show that up to half of the estimated migration costs can be explained by higher
living costs in urban areas and income risk associated with migration. The other half reﬂects
non-monetary costs of living and working in the city.
To evaluate the eﬀect of the NREGA on short-term migration, our identiﬁcation strategy
relies on variation in program implementation across states and seasons. We leverage the
unique design of our survey, which covered 35 village pairs including 35 villages in Rajasthan
and 35 matched villages just across the border in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat.3 We ﬁrst
show that virtually all NREGA employment is provided during the summer months (mid-
March to mid-July), and that 35% more work is provided in Rajasthan villages than in
villages in other states. These diﬀerences in NREGA employment reﬂect diﬀerences in supply,
not demand for NREGA work.4 We next ﬁnd that in Rajasthan, during the summer, the
average respondent spends 23% less time migrating and is 18% less likely to migrate at all.
We perform a number of robustness checks to show that our estimates are indeed identi-
fying the eﬀect of the NREGA and not diﬀerences in rural poverty and migration patterns
unrelated to the program. First, there is no diﬀerence in migration across states in the win-
ter, when short-term migration is high but no NREGA employment is provided. Second, our
estimates do not change when we control for worker characteristics and include village pair
ﬁxed eﬀects. Third, our results strengthen when we use only village pairs between Rajasthan
and Madhya Pradesh, which are more comparable in terms of transport infrastructures. Fi-
nally, based on retrospective questions, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in reported levels of
migration across states in 2005, before NREGA implementation. There is also no diﬀerence
in permanent migration across states.
It is perhaps surprising that migration appears to be so strongly aﬀected by the workfare
program, given that daily earnings outside of the village are much higher than public works
wages.5 These large wage diﬀerentials combined with high demand for NREGA work suggest
3Villages were matched based on population composition and agricultural production (see Section 2).
4There is abundant evidence that demand under the NREGA is rationed (Dutta et al., 2012, 2014).
NREGA beneﬁciaries need to register locally, hence one cannot migrate to apply for NREGA work elsewhere.
5The gap in earnings could simply reﬂect diﬀerential productivity between migrants and NREGA partic-
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substantial migration costs. We investigate this question formally by modeling household
short-term migration decisions in a framework similar to Benjamin (1992). Short-term mi-
gration provides a higher monetary return than local work but workers also incur a ﬂow cost
for each day spent away. We estimate the model structurally to match expressed demand
for NREGA work among migrants. Our estimates imply that the ﬂow cost of one day away
may be as high as 60% of daily earnings in the city.
The utility cost of migration may be due to a wide range of factors, which we attempt
to quantify using detailed information about migrants' trips. We ﬁrst consider diﬀerences in
living costs between the village and the city. Using the ratio of poverty lines at destination
and origin as a deﬂator and making diﬀerent assumptions about migrants' consumption
basket, we ﬁnd that price diﬀerences may explain up to 18% of the estimated migration
cost. We next quantify the utility cost of income risk. To measure the variance of migration
earnings, we use variation in earnings for the same individual across years. Under reasonable
assumptions about risk aversion, we ﬁnd that the disutility of income risk may explain up to
27% of the estimated migration cost. The remaining 55% are likely due to the disutility of
rough living and working conditions at destination. We show that this cost is higher among
older migrants, and among migrants who have electricity at home. We ﬁnd mixed evidence
on destination amenities (crime and air pollution).
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we present new causal
evidence on the eﬀect of workfare programs on private sector employment. The existing
evidence is mixed and focuses on local impacts (Zimmermann, 2012; Imbert and Papp, 2015;
Muralidharan et al., 2017; Berg et al., 2018).6 Some studies have argued that India's NREGA
may provide an alternative to seasonal migration (Jacob, 2008; Ashish and Bhatia, 2009). In
particular, Morten (2016) simulates the eﬀect of an employment guarantee on pre-NREGA
data and predicts that by oﬀering an alternative insurance mechanism, the NREGA should
crowd-out migration. Our contribution is to provide the ﬁrst causal evidence of NREGA's
impact on rural-to-urban migration using a dedicated survey and a border discontinuity
design. We show that workfare programs operating during the agricultural oﬀ-season may
have a signiﬁcant negative impact on employment outside of the village. In a follow-up
paper, we conﬁrm this ﬁnding using nationally representative data and estimate the eﬀect
of the decline in seasonal migration on urban wages (Imbert and Papp, 2016).
Second, we use demand for employment on public works among migrants to shed light
ipants, but the wage diﬀerential persists even for adults who both migrate and do NREGA work.
6India's NREGA being the largest workfare program in the world, has attracted more attention,
but(Beegle et al., 2017) and Alik-Lagrange et al. (2017) study public works programs in other contexts.
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on the determinants of migration decisions in developing countries. The literature highlights
the importance of ﬁnancial constraints, and reliance on village-based insurance networks
(Angelucci, 2015; Bazzi, 2017; Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016). Since these costs are high for
permanent migration, Bryan et al. (2014) argue that temporary migration to urban areas
during the oﬀ-season of agriculture could be a proﬁtable technology. They ﬁnd that a small
transport cost subsidy in rural Bangladesh has large positive eﬀects on seasonal migration,
and brings signiﬁcant income and consumption gains. They argue that the subsidy alleviates
the uninsured risk of failed migration and the lack of information on returns to migration.
In contrast, we study villages where 71% of households have a migrant, so that migration
earnings are common knowledge. We ﬁnd that short-term migration decisions are mostly
driven by (the lack of) employment opportunities in the village, given the large disutility
cost of working in the city. Income risk explains about 27% of this cost.7
Third, we quantify migration costs based on information on earnings for the same worker
performing the same task in and outside of the village. This helps overcome selection issues
which plague the debate on the existence of the rural-urban wage gap in developing countries.
The literature often interprets diﬀerences in real wages, or productivity per worker between
rural and urban areas as evidence of wedges, or barriers to migration (Gollin et al., 2014;
Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016). However, Young (2013) argues that in 65 countries the entire
gap can be explained by the fact that production in urban areas is more skill intensive, and
attract more skilled workers. Hicks et al. (2017) also ﬁnd little income gains for workers who
settle down in urban areas in Indonesia. Our contribution is to show that the same worker
doing the same task in the same season can earn 57% more on urban private construction
sites than on local public works. To rationalize the fact that most of them still prefer to join
the program, migration costs have to be high. We provide evidence that this opportunity
cost has an important non-monetary component.
The following section describes the workfare program and presents the data set used in
the paper. Section 3 uses variation in public employment provision across states and seasons
to estimate the impact of the program on short-term migration. Section 4 uses detailed
information on migration and demand for public works to provide structural estimates of
migration costs. Finally, Section 5 considers diﬀerent components of the estimated migration
cost and attempts to quantify them.
7A recent re-evaluation of the Bryan et al. (2014) Bangladesh experiment by Lagakos et al. (2018) argues
that the welfare gains from migration subsidies may be limited by a large non-monetary cost of migration.
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2 Context and data
2.1 NREGA
This paper studies India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), which
entitles every household in rural India to 100 days of work per year at a state-level minimum
wage. The NREGA is the largest workfare program in the world: in 2016-17 it provided
2.36 billion person-days of employment to 51 million households.8 Implementation is highly
heterogeneous across states (Dreze and Khera, 2009; Dreze and Oldiges, 2009). As Figure
1 shows, the number of days spent on public works by the average rural adult ranges from
almost zero in Haryana (HR) to 12 in Andhra Pradesh (AP), and varies widely across the
three states of our study: Rajasthan (RJ) provides 11 days of public works employment per
adult, Madhya Pradesh (MP) 2.6 days, and Gujarat (GJ) 1.4 days.9 Dutta et al. (2012)
argue that cross-states diﬀerences in NREGA implementation do not reﬂect underlying de-
mand for NREGA work. Rather than socio-economic conditions, the quality of NREGA
implementation seems to be explained by some combination of political will, administrative
capacity, and previous experience in providing public works.
Employment provision under the NREGA also varies within the year. Public works are
often closed at the time of the monsoon (July) and reopen after the main (kharif ) harvest
(December). As a result, most NREGA employment is provided during the ﬁrst half of the
year. The seasonality of NREGA works is driven by both practical and political consid-
erations. Most NREGA works are construction projects, which are diﬃcult to carry out
during the heavy monsoon rains. Also, local governments in charge of NREGA implemen-
tation tend to avoid competing with demand for work in agriculture (Association for Indian
Development, 2009). Figure 2 shows the variation in time spent on public works across quar-
ters during the agricultural year 2009-10 in the three states of our study (Gujarat, Madhya
Pradesh and Rajasthan), according to NSS data. Public employment drops from 2.5 days to
1.25 between the second and third quarter, and stays below one day in the fourth and ﬁrst
quarter.10
Work under the act is short-term, often on the order of a few weeks per adult. Households
with at least one member employed under the act during agricultural year 2009-10 report
a mean of only 38 days of work and a median of 30 days for all members of the household
8Figures are from the oﬃcial NREGA website nrega.nic.in.
9Authors' calculations based on the National Sample Survey Organization (NSS) Employment-
Unemployment survey Round 66.
10Authors' calculations based on the NSS Employment-Unemployment survey Round 66.
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during that year, which is well below the guaranteed 100 days. Within the study area as well
as throughout India, work under the program is rationed (Dutta et al., 2012). During the
agricultural year 2009-10, an estimated 19% of Indian households reported attempting to get
work under the act without success.11 The rationing rule is at the discretion of local oﬃcials:
workers are actively recruited for work by village oﬃcials rather than applying for work (The
World Bank, 2011). Finally, work is provided only to households who are registered in the
village council (Gram Panchayat). Thus, workers cannot migrate to another village - let
alone another state - to participate in the NREGA.
2.2 Survey
2.2.1 Sample Selection
Our analysis draws from a survey collected by John Papp with Diane Coﬀey and Dean Spears
Coﬀey et al. (2015). Figure 3 shows the location of the 70 sample villages. The selection
of sample villages proceeded in three steps. First, we selected one district in Rajasthan and
three neighbouring districts, one in Gujarat and two in Madhya Pradesh. The survey loca-
tion was chosen because previous studies in the area reported high rates of out-migration and
poverty (Mosse et al., 2002), and because surveying along the border of the three states pro-
vided variation in state-level policies. Second, we matched villages in Rajasthan with villages
across the border in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh based on seven criteria: distance, fraction
of Scheduled Castes (SC), fraction of Scheduled Tribes (ST), cultivated area, irrigated and
non-irrigated cultivated area and population per cultivated area.12 Finally, we selected the
25 best matches across along the Madhya Pradesh border and the 10 best matches along
the Gujarat border to be part of the survey sample.13 As Panel A of Table 1 shows, this
procedure ensured that village pairs were well balanced along these dimensions.
The survey itself consisted of three modules: village, household, and adult modules.14 The
household module was completed by the household head or other knowledgeable member.
One-on-one interviews were attempted with each adult aged 14 to 69 in each household.
The analysis in this paper focuses mostly on those adults who completed the full one-on-one
interviews. Appendix Table A.1 presents means of key variables for the subset of adults
who answered the one-on-one interviews as well as all adults in surveyed households. Out of
11Author's calculations based on the NSS Employment-Unemployment Survey Round 66.
12Village characteristics used for matching were measured in the 2001 census, before the NREGA.
13The best matches were pairs with the lowest sum of squared distances over the seven criteria.
14In 69 of the 70 villages, a local village oﬃcial answered questions about village-level services, amenities
and labor market conditions. We do not use this data in the analysis.
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2,722 adults aged 14-69, we were able to complete interviews with 2,224 (81.7%). Column
4 presents the diﬀerence in means between adults who completed the one-on-one interview
and those who did not. The 498 adults that we were unable to survey are diﬀerent from
adults that were interviewed along a number of characteristics. Perhaps most strikingly, 40%
of the adults that we were unable to survey were away from the village for work during all
three seasons of the year compared with eight percent for the adults that we did interview.
These migrants are also less likely to be aﬀected by the NREGA: they are half as likely to
have ever done NREGA work as other adults in the sample.15
To assess how the adults in our sample compare with the rural population in India,
Column 5 in appendix Table A.1 presents means from the rural sample of the nationally
representative NSS Employment-Unemployment Survey. Literacy rates are substantially
lower in the study sample compared with India as a whole, reﬂecting the fact that the study
area is a particularly poor area of rural India. The NSS asks only one question about short-
term migration, which is whether an individual spent between 30 and 180 days away from
the village for work within the past year. Based on this measure, adults in our sample are
28 percentage points more likely to be short-term migrants than adults in India as a whole.
Part of this diﬀerence may be due to the fact that the survey instrument was speciﬁcally
designed to pick up short-term migration, though most of the diﬀerence is more likely due
to the fact that the sample is drawn from a high out-migration area. Column 6 in Table A.1
shows the short-term migration rate is 16% for the four districts chosen for the migration
survey according to NSS, which is half the mean in sample villages (30%) but well above the
all-India average (2%).
2.2.2 Seasons
The survey instrument was speciﬁcally designed to measure migration, cultivation, and par-
ticipation in the NREGA, which are all highly seasonal. The survey was implemented at the
end of the summer 2010, i.e. when most migrants come back for the start of the agricultural
peak season. Surveyors asked retrospective questions to each household member about each
activity separately for summer 2010, winter 2009-10, monsoon 2009, and summer 2009. Most
respondents were surveyed between mid summer 2010 and early monsoon 2010, so that in
many cases, summer 2010 was not yet complete at the survey date. As a result, when we
refer to a variable computed over the past year, it corresponds to summer 2009, monsoon
15We can include adults who were not interviewed personally in the analysis by using information collected
from the household head and check that our results are not aﬀected. We choose not to use this information
in our main speciﬁcation to maximize precision of our estimates, but include it later as a robustness check.
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2009, and winter 2009-10. Respondents were much more familiar with seasons than calendar
months, and there is not an exact mapping from months to seasons. Summer is roughly
mid-March through mid-July. The monsoon season is mid-July through mid-November, and
winter is mid-November through mid-March.
2.2.3 Measuring Demand for NREGA Work
An important variable for the following analysis is whether an individual wanted to work
more for the NREGA during a particular season. Speciﬁcally, the question is, if more
NREGA work were available during [season] would you work more? for individuals who
had worked for the NREGA. For individuals who did not work for the NREGA, we asked
did you want to work for the NREGA during [season]? One should be skeptical that
the answer to these questions truly indicates a person's willingness to work. Appendix
Table A.2 shows that the correlations between the response to the resulting measure of
demand and respondent characteristics are sensible: demand for NREGA is lower for adults
with secondary education, and those who have a formal salaried job. Interestingly, adults
who have migrated during the summer 2009 are more likely to say that they would have
liked to do NREGA work during that season, which is consistent with the idea that the
NREGA competes with seasonal migration. We also check the reasons given by respondents
for why they did not work if they wanted to work and why they did not want to work if they
reported not wanting to work. The closure of worksites and the inaction of village oﬃcials
are the main reasons given by respondents who wanted more NREGA work while other work
opportunities, studies, and sickness are the the main reasons given by respondents who did
not want more NREGA work.
2.2.4 Migration Patterns
In order to assess the costs of migration, we require reliable information on what migrants
do and how much they earn. Given the short-term nature of most migrant jobs, the same
migrant might work for multiple employers for diﬀerent wages and make multiple trips within
the same season. For this reason, the survey instrument included questions about earnings,
wages, and jobs for each trip within the past four seasons up to a maximum of four trips.
Some migrants still might hold multiple jobs and therefore earn diﬀerent wages within the
same trip, but daily earnings and jobs characteristics are probably more similar within the
same migration trip than within the same season. In total, this yields detailed observations
for 2,749 trips taken by 1,125 adults. So that we do not overweight migrants who took more
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frequent, shorter trips relative to migrants who took less frequent, longer trips, we calculate
the average across trips for each migrant for each season that the migrant was away, using
trip duration as weight. Finally, we take into account the possibility that migrants do not
always ﬁnd work at destination by using earnings per day away, rather than earnings per
day worked as our main measure of migration returns.16 One important downside of asking
respondents about their four most recent trips, is that we do not have detailed information
on trips done in earlier seasons for people who migrated more than four times in the last
year. In particular, for 200 adults who migrated in the summer 2009 (out of 768 in total),
we do not know where they went, for how long, or how much they earned.
Columns 1 to 3 in Table 2 presents descriptive information about short-term migration
trips based on the survey. As expected, migration is concentrated during the winter and
the summer and is much lower during the peak agricultural season (from July to Novem-
ber). Short-term migrants travel relatively long distances (300km on average during the
summer), and a large majority goes to urban areas and works in the construction sector.17
Employer-employee relationships are often short-term: only 37% of migrants knew their em-
ployer or labor contractor before leaving the village. Living arrangements at destination
are rudimentary, with 86% of migrants reporting having no formal shelter (often a bivouac
on the work-site itself). Most migrants travel and work with family members, only 16%
have migrated alone. Table 2 shows that migrants are close to full employment, they work
on average six days per week spent at destination. Their average earnings per day away is
Rs. 101, which means that their travel cost (Rs. 110) is recouped in a couple of days. Column
4 presents national averages from NSS data. Migration patterns are similar along the few
dimensions measured in both surveys. The average rural short-term migrant in India as a
whole is less likely to go to urban areas, and more likely to work in the manufacturing or
mining sector than in the survey sample. As before, averages from NSS for the four districts
of the survey sample are closer to the survey estimates (Column 5).
3 Program eﬀect on migration
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Before providing causal evidence of the program eﬀect on migration, we describe the correla-
tion between demand for NREGA work, program participation and short-term migration in
16Appendix A describes the construction of the earnings measures in more detail.
17Figure A.1 in Appendix illustrates that migrants from the survey area travel across the country.
10
the survey data (Appendix Table A.3). Survey data shows that in our sample as in the rest
of India NREGA work provision is highly seasonal, with 40% of all adults working for the
NREGA in the summer, 0% during the monsoon and 6% only during the winter (Column
4 in Table A.3). It also conﬁrms the high, unmet demand for NREGA work; 80% of all
adults would have worked more for the NREGA during the summer if they were provided
work. During the summer, when both migration and NREGA work coexist, we ﬁnd that
12% of all adults both migrated and did NREGA work. Demand for NREGA work was also
higher among migrants than for the population as a whole: 86% of migrants (30% of adults)
declare they would have done more NREGA work. Furthermore, 8% of all adults declared
they would have migrated during the summer if there had not been NREGA work. These
results suggest that NREGA work reduced or could potentially reduce migration for 38% of
adults.
Comparing Columns 1, 2 and 3 in Appendix Table A.3 reveals important diﬀerences
across states. As explained in Section 2, the 70 sample villages were selected on each side of
the border of the state of Rajasthan with two other states: Madhya Pradesh, and Gujarat.
Table A.3 shows that the fraction of adults who worked for the NREGA during the summer
2009 was 50% in Rajasthan, 39% in Madhya Pradesh, and 10% in Gujarat. Even conditional
on participation, NREGA workers received 31 days of work in Rajasthan on average, against
22 days in Madhya Pradesh and 25 days in Gujarat. Interestingly, the fraction of adults who
reported wanting to work for the NREGA and the number of days of NREGA work they
wanted were very similar across states, between 78% and 81%, and between 41 and 48 days,
respectively. This suggests that in the sample as in the rest of India variation in NREGA
employment provision were due to diﬀerences in political will and administrative capacity in
implementing the scheme rather than diﬀerences in demand for work (Dutta et al., 2012).
Table A.3 also provides descriptive evidence that higher NREGA work provision is asso-
ciated with lower migration. The proportion of adults who declare they stopped migrating
because of NREGA in the summer increases from 3% in Gujarat to 8% in Madhya Pradesh
and 10% in Rajasthan (Panel A). In the following sections, we use variation in NREGA
employment provision across states and seasons to estimate the causal eﬀect of the program
on seasonal migration.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
In order to estimate the impact of the NREGA on days spent outside the village we exploit
the variation in program implementation across states and compare Rajasthan with Gujarat
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and Madhya Pradesh. We also take advantage of the seasonality of public employment
provision and compare the summer months, when most employment is provided, to the rest
of the year. The estimating equation is:
Yis = α +β0Raji + β1Sums + β3Raji ∗ Sums + γXi + εis (1)
where Yis is the outcome for adult i in season s, Raji is a dummy variable equal to one if the
adult lives in Rajasthan, Sums is a dummy variable equal to one for the summer season (mid-
March to mid-July) and Xi are controls. The vector Xi includes all worker characteristics
(gender, age, education, marital status, language skills), households characteristics (size,
religion, caste, wealth), and village controls (population and connectivity) listed in Table 1,
as well as village pair ﬁxed eﬀects.18 Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
In order for β3 to identify the impact of the NREGA, villages in Rajasthan need to
be comparable with their match on the other side of the border in all respects other than
NREGA implementation. Potential threats to our identiﬁcation strategy include diﬀerences
in socio-economic conditions or other state policies (infrastructures, education, health etc.).
Table 1 presents sample means of village characteristics for village pairs in Rajasthan and
Madhya Pradesh and village pairs in Rajasthan and Gujarat. Matching variables (Panel A)
are balanced by construction. Other socio-economic characteristics, such as population size,
age and household structure, literacy rate, fraction of households who depend on agriculture
as their main source of income are also balanced across borders (Panel B, C and D). There
are however signiﬁcant diﬀerences in transportation and communication infrastructure. In
particular, villages in Gujarat are more likely to get bus service, they are closer to towns,
and have greater access to electricity and mobile phone networks. We check that our results
are robust to including village characteristics in our analysis as controls, and to excluding
village pairs with Gujarat.
3.3 Results
Table 3 presents our results on the causal eﬀect of the program on migration. We ﬁrst
use days worked for the NREGA in each season as an outcome and estimate Equation 1.
Column 1 conﬁrms that across states, virtually no public employment was provided outside
of the summer months. During the summer 2009, adults in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat,
18We also estimate our speciﬁcation including a dummy variable for whether the adult reported being
willing to work more for the NREGA in this particular season and ﬁnd similar results (not reported here).
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worked about six days for the NREGA. The coeﬃcient on the interaction of Rajasthan and
summer suggests that in Rajasthan nine more days of public employment were provided.
The estimated coeﬃcients do not change at all after including controls and village pair ﬁxed
eﬀects (Column 2). Panel B in Table 3 presents the estimates obtained without villages
on the border of Gujarat and Rajasthan. Comparing villages on either side of the border
between Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, adults in Rajasthan worked on average seven days
more on NREGA worksites than adults in Madhya Pradesh.
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 3 repeat the same analysis with days spent outside the village
for work as the dependent variable. Estimates from Panel A suggest that the average adult
in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat villages spent 11 days away for work during the monsoon
and the winter 2009. Adults in Rajasthan villages spent a day less away for work, but the
diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant and changes sign once we include controls. By contrast, in the
summer 2009 adults in Rajasthan villages spent ﬁve and a half fewer days on average working
outside the village than their counterparts in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, who were away
for 24 days on average. The estimated coeﬃcients hardly change with the inclusion of controls
and village pair ﬁxed eﬀects. As a robustness check, we estimate the same speciﬁcation
without the village pairs that include Gujarat villages. The magnitude of the eﬀect increases
to eight and a half days per adult (Column 3 Panel B). Taken together, our estimates suggest
that one day of additional NREGA work reduces migration by 0.6 to 1.2 days.19
This eﬀect is the combination of a reduction in the probability of migrating (exten-
sive margin) and the length of migration trips conditional on migrating (intensive margin).
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 present estimates of Equation 1 taking as the outcome a binary
variable equal to one if the respondent migrated during the season. In Madhya Pradesh
and Gujarat villages, 20% of adults migrated at some point between July 2009 and March
2010. The probability is exactly the same in Rajasthan villages. During the summer 2009,
on average 39% adults migrated in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat villages. The proportion of
migrants was seven percentage points lower in Rajasthan villages and the diﬀerence is highly
signiﬁcant. When we compare only villages in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan (Panel B),
we ﬁnd that the probability of migrating during the summer was 11 percentage point lower
in Rajasthan. The estimates are robust to the inclusion of controls and pair ﬁxed eﬀects.20
19We repeat the same analysis including adults who were not interviewed personally but about whom
information was collected from the household head. The results, shown in Appendix Table A.4 are extremely
similar. As discussed in Section 2.2 adults who were not interviewed personally were more likely to migrate
in all seasons, and hence less likely to change their migration behavior in response to the NREGA.
20We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the number of trips made during the season between villages in
Rajasthan and villages in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh (results not shown).
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The diﬀerences we observe in migration patterns between Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh
and Gujarat could be partly due to preexisting diﬀerences unrelated to the NREGA. The
fact that we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerence across states in migration during the
monsoon and winter seasons, when the program is not implemented, gives some reassurance
that migration patterns are not systematically diﬀerent across states. We also compare
the number of long-term migrants across-states, i.e. individuals who changed residence and
left the household in the last ﬁve years, and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences (see Appendix
Table A.7). Finally, the survey included retrospective questions about migration trips in
previous years. Using non missing responses, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in migration
levels in 2004 and 2005, i.e. before the NREGA was implemented (see appendix Figure A.2).
Unfortunately, the fraction of respondents who forgot whether they migrated is high, about
22% for 2005 and 47% for 2004.
4 Estimating Migration Costs
4.1 Theoretical framework
In this section, we outline a theoretical framework to understand the impact of the program
on migration decisions by rural workers, and use it to structurally estimate the ﬂow cost of
migration. Let us consider an individual living in a rural area. She splits her time T between
work outside the village Lm and work in the village (T − Lm). In-village earnings take the
form f(T − Lm) with f(·) increasing and concave. Leaving the village requires a ﬁxed cost
cf and a variable cost cv per unit of time spent outside the village. While outside the village,
migrants earn wm per day away. Time spent outside the village Lm maximizes:
max
Lm∈[0,T ]
U = f(T − Lm) + (wm − cv)Lm − cf1{Lm > 0}
For any interior solution Lm > 0, the optimal period of time spent migrating is L
∗
m such that
f ′(T −L∗m) = wm− cv. The model assumes that the utility function is linear in earnings and
that there is no leisure choice. More generally, one could think of f(T − L∗m) as capturing
utility from time spent in the village after the individual has optimally chosen work outside of
the village Lm and leisure given a time constraint of T . Similarly, (wm−cv)Lm−cf1{Lm > 0}
captures utility from time spent outside the village.
Next, we consider what happens when Lg days of government work (NREGA work) are
oﬀered within the village at wage wg. We assume Lg is small relative to the usual duration of
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migration trips (Lg << L
∗
m) and ﬁxed, i.e. workers may choose whether or not participate to
the program, but not the number of days they work.21 Under these assumptions the optimal
migration duration remains L∗m. In the survey, individuals were asked whether or not they
would have wanted to do more NREGA work than they did. We interpret a positive answer
to this question as indicating that for the respondent the marginal value of time is lower
than the program wage wg. For migrants, the marginal value of time is f
′(T − L∗m), which
is equal to the diﬀerence between the daily wage away wm minus the ﬂow cost of migration
cv. Formally, let M be a dummy variable equal to one when the individual migrates and G
a dummy variable equal to one if the individual declares wanting more NREGA:
G = 1|M=1 ⇔ wm − cv < wg (2)
4.2 Estimation Strategy
We build on our model and use equation 2 to identify the variable cost of migration cv for
migrants. We assume that cv follows a normal distribution:
cv ∼ N (µv, σ2v)
Under these assumptions the probability of wanting more work conditional on migrating is:
Pr(G = 1|M=1) = 1−Φµv,σv(wm − wg)
where Φµv,σv denotes the c.d.f. of the normal distribution with mean µv and variance σ
2
v .
The main identiﬁcation assumption is that migrants who say that they want more work
mean that they would have done NREGA work and still migrated, i.e. that we can interpret
their answer purely on the intensive margin.22 Under this assumption, we can estimate µv
and σv by maximum likelihood:
logL =
∑
Gi=1
ln
(
Φ
(
wim − µc
σc
)
− Φ
(
wim − wig − µc
σc
))
+
∑
Gi=0
ln
(
Φ
(
wim − wig − µc
σc
))
21These assumptions are consistent with the fact that demand for NREGA work is rationed, far below the
mandated 100 days (see Section 2.1). During the summer 2009 less than 15% of adults who worked for the
NREGA received more than 32 days, but more than 85% of adults who migrated were away for more than
32 days.
22This can be tested using information on how many days of NREGA work they say they would have
wanted. We check that our results are robust to excluding migrants for which the desired number of NREGA
days is higher than the number of days they migrated.
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The estimation requires potential demand for work, migration earnings and NREGA
earnings for each migrant during the same season. For all 768 migrants who were interviewed
personally, we know whether they would have liked to do more NREGA work in the summer
2009. As discussed in Section 2.2, however, we do not observe migration earnings in the
summer 2009 for the 200 migrants who took more than four trips in the last year. We
predict their earnings per day away by regressing migration earnings of the remaining 568
migrants on migration earnings in other seasons and on worker and household controls. We
also need to predict NREGA earnings for the 501 migrants who have not worked for the
NREGA in the summer 2009. For this, we regress NREGA earnings of the 267 migrants
who did NREGA work on program participation and earnings in other seasons, as well as on
worker and household controls. Appendix Table A.5 presents the estimates. In both cases,
the mean of predicted and observed earnings are virtually the same, which suggests that
migrants for whom we do not observe migration or NREGA earnings are not systematically
diﬀerent from the others (see appendix A for more detail).
4.3 Results
Table A.6 in appendix presents earnings per day spent outside the village for migrants and
per day worked for the NREGA for adults who worked outside of the village in the summer
2009.23 For the average migrant, earnings outside of the village are 53% higher than earnings
on NREGA work sites (Column 1). Columns 2 and 3 further split the sample of migrants
into those who report wanting more NREGA work and those who report not wanting more
NREGA work. As expected, the diﬀerential between daily earnings outside the village and
NREGA earnings is much higher for migrants who do not want NREGA work (73%). But
even for migrants who would have wanted to do NREGA work the diﬀerence in earnings is
substantial: they would have earned 50% more per day outside of the village than per day
worked on NREGA worksites. Of course, a majority of migrants did not actually work for
the NREGA, so that these comparisons are based on predicted rather than actual earnings.
As a check, the last column restricts the sample to adults who both worked outside the
village and did NREGA work in the summer 2009. The pattern is very similar: earnings
outside of the village are much higher (51%) than earnings from NREGA work.
Table 4 presents the estimated distribution of variable migration costs using the frame-
work set out in the previous section. For the average migrant (Panel A), the ﬂow utility cost
per day away is 60 rupees which is 59% of the average daily earnings per day away from
23The construction of these variables is described in detail in Section 2.2 and Appendix A.
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the village. Our estimation relies on the assumption that when migrants declare that they
would have liked to do more NREGA work, they compare utility from one day away and one
day working on the program. This rules out any consideration of ﬁxed costs associated with
migration (cf in the model) or participation to the program. We test the robustness of our
results in four ways. First, we restrict the sample to migrants for whom we actually observe
migration earnings. The results in Column 2 of Table 4 are virtually unchanged. Second, we
restrict the sample to migrants who have worked for the NREGA during the season, so that
they have already paid any cost of participation. The results are again very similar (Column
3 of Table 4). Third, we restrict the sample to migrants who declare wanting a number
of NREGA days lower than the number of days they were away, so that even if they had
participated to the program as much as they wanted they would still have migrated (paid
cf ). As Column 4 of Table 4 shows, the estimated ﬂow cost of migration for these migrants is
lower, but still about 45% of migration earnings. Finally, we restrict the sample to migrants
who declared wanting a number of NREGA days higher than the total days in the season
minus the number of days they spent migrating, so that they could not possibly have done
as much NREGA work without migrating less. The estimated ﬂow cost of migration is again
lower, but still about 44% of migration earnings (Column 5 of Table 4).
These structural estimates suggest that the ﬂow cost of migration needs to be very
high to explain that many migrants are ready to forgo higher wages at destination and do
NREGA work in the village. In the following section, we assess the relative importance of
two possible sources of migration costs: higher costs of living at destination, and uncertainty
about earnings from migration. We then discuss other possible factors.
5 Explaining Migration Costs
5.1 Diﬀerences in living costs
Living in urban areas is more expensive than living in the village, and migrants may need to
pay for goods they would get for free or cheaply at home. Since our estimation relies on nom-
inal comparisons, any diﬀerence in living costs will enter the ﬂow cost of migration. Existing
evidence on urban-rural wage gaps in India suggests that adjusting for living costs may be
important. Using NSS 2009-10 Employment Unemployment surveys and state poverty lines
as deﬂators, Hnatkovska and Lahiri (2013) show that urban-rural real wage gaps are zero, or
even negative at the bottom of the distribution of wages. Deﬂators used for urban residents
may not be however appropriate for short-term migrants if their respective consumption
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baskets are very diﬀerent. As we saw from Table 2, 86% of migrants in the summer 2009 had
no formal shelter but bivouacked on the worksite. Most of the remaining 14% stayed with
friends and family. This suggests that very few migrants actually paid for housing, which is
an important part of living costs of urban residents. Similarly, expenditures on education,
health and durable goods are likely made at home and not at destination. Food is perhaps
the only type of expenditures short-term migrants need to make at higher prices in urban
areas.
In order to evaluate what fraction of the estimated ﬂow cost of migration can be explained
by diﬀerences in living costs, we consider three possible deﬂators for migration earnings, We
ﬁrst follow Hnatkovska and Lahiri (2013) and compute the ratio of the urban poverty line
in the state of destination to the average rural poverty line in the three states of origin:
Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan (Planning Commission, 2009). Let Pr denote the
poverty line for households in rural areas of the states of origin and Pu the urban poverty
line of the states of destination. The ﬁrst deﬂator is simply:
D1 =
Pu
Pr
This deﬂator is only valid if seasonal migrants have the same consumption basket as poor
urban residents. Since migrants expenditures at destination do not include housing, educa-
tion, health and durable goods, they should be excluded from the deﬂator. We next use NSS
Employment Unemployment Survey to estimate the share of non-durable expenditures in
urban and rural areas of each state for households whose per capita expenditures are within
5% of the poverty line. Let Pr and S
1
r (resp Pu and S
1
u) denote the poverty line and the
share of non-durable expenditures for households at the poverty line in rural (resp. urban)
areas. The second deﬂator is :
D2 =
Pu ∗ S1u + Pr ∗ (1− S1r )
Pr
Since we do not know in detail the actual consumption basket of migrants at destination
but presume that it is mostly composed of food items, we construct a third deﬂator, which
only includes food. We again use NSS Employment Unemployment Survey to estimate food
shares in urban and rural areas for households whose per capita expenditures are within 5%
of the poverty line. Let Pr and S
2
r (resp Pu and S
2
u) denote the poverty line and the share of
food expenditures for households at the poverty line in rural (resp. urban) areas. The third
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deﬂator is:
D3 =
Pu ∗ S2u + Pr ∗ (1− S2r )
Pr
As expected given the diﬀerence in consumption baskets between rural and urban households,
the ﬁrst deﬂator is higher than the second, which is higher than the third. For the migrants
in our sample, the ﬁrst deﬂator is equal to 1.3 (sd 0.12), the second to 1.13 (sd 0.09) and
the third to 1.04 (sd 0.04).
We implement our estimation of migration costs using these three deﬂators. The results
are presented in Table 5. Column 1 reports the same estimates as in Table 4 above. Since
we can only consider the appropriate deﬂator when the destination is known, we ﬁrst report
the estimates when we restrict the sample to migrants whose destination we could locate.
As Column 2 shows, the results are virtually identical. In Column 3, we estimate migration
costs assuming that when they are at destination, migrants spend their income as urban
residents do. As expected, estimated migration costs are lower: only about 34% of migra-
tion earnings, which is 40% lower than the initial estimate. However, as Column 4 shows,
once we exclude durable expenditures from the deﬂator, the estimate of migration costs is
substantially higher, about 47% of migration earnings (18% lower than the initial estimate).
Finally, when we consider only food expenditures, the estimated migration cost is equal to
53% of migration earnings, only 7% lower than the estimate without deﬂating (Column 5).
In the absence of detailed consumption data at origin and destination for migrants, these
ﬁgures provide suggestive evidence that diﬀerences in living costs between destination and
origin may only explain between 7 and 18% of the estimated ﬂow cost of migration.
5.2 Risk in migration earnings
Another source of utility cost associated with migration is income risk: migrants may not
ﬁnd work at destination or may have to work for lower wages than expected. Bryan et al.
(2014) argue the risk of failed migration is an important barrier to seasonal migration during
the hunger season in Bangladesh. They also ﬁnd evidence of individual learning on migration
risk, but little evidence of peer eﬀects, which suggests that risk is idiosynchratic. In contrast
with Bryan et al. (2014), individual learning has already taken place in the context we study:
71% of short term migrants in the Summer 2010 report having migrated in the Summer 2009,
and only 8.6% have never migrated before. We can use information on migration earnings
from repeated trips to estimate the idiosynchratic risk migrants are exposed to. Earnings are
deﬁned as earnings per day away, which allows us to account for both employment and wage
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risk. We restrict the analysis to 435 migrants for whom we have earnings per day away for
both summers 2009 and 2010. Their average daily earnings in the Summer 2009 are Rs. 100.
We then run a regression of earnings per season on season and migrant ﬁxed eﬀects and
estimate the standard deviation of the residuals. The estimated standard deviation, which
is our measure of income risk, is Rs. 25.24
We next use the estimated mean and variance of migration earnings to compute the
relative risk premium, i.e. the amount one would need to guarantee to migrants at home to
make them indiﬀerent between migrating and not migrating, expressed as a fraction of daily
migration earnings. If we assume migrants utility has constant relative risk aversion ρ then
the relative risk premium (RPP) can be approximated as a simple function of the mean µ̂
and standard deviation σ̂ of daily migration earnings:
RRP ≈ ρσ̂
2
2µ̂2
≈ ρ
32
Table 6 presents the results of the calibration. Even assuming a very high level of relative
risk aversion ρ = 5 the relative risk premium is only .16, i.e. a quarter of the estimated ﬂow
cost of migration. For more moderate levels of risk aversion ρ ≈ 1.5, which Bryan et al. (2014)
ﬁnd match the evidence on migration decisions relatively well, the relative risk premium is
slightly below .05, or 8% of our estimate of the ﬂow cost of migration. As an alternative
calibration, we use Binswanger (1980) results on risk aversion of Indian farmers. Binswanger
(1980) uses lotteries to elicit Z, the increase in expected returns needed to compensate for an
increase in the standard deviation of gains, and ﬁnds that for the majority of farmers it ranges
from 0.33 to 0.66. We can use these ﬁgures to obtain a relative risk premium (RRP = Z σ
µ
)
which ranges from .08 to .16. According to these estimates, income risk explains between 13
and 27% of the estimated ﬂow cost of migration.
5.3 Non-monetary costs of migration
Taken together, our ﬁndings suggest that under reasonable assumptions diﬀerences in living
costs and migration risk can account for up to only a half of the estimated utility cost of
migration. The disutility cost of bivouacking for months in the city, leaving family behind is
presumably also important, but harder to quantify. In order to provide evidence on this non-
24Alternatively, we can use cross-sectional variation only and estimate idiosynchratic risk as the standard
deviation of the residuals of a regression of daily migration earnings in the Summer 2009 on workers char-
acteristics, migration history and village ﬁxed eﬀects. The estimated standard deviation is Rs. 29, close to,
but higher than our preferred estimate.
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monetary dimension of migration costs, we regress the demand for NREGA work on migrant
and trip characteristics, controlling for migration and NREGA earnings. Speciﬁcally, let Did
be a dummy variable set equal to one if individual i who migrated to destination d in the
summer 2009 declared that she would have liked to do more NREGA work in that season. As
before, let wim and w
i
g denote migration and NREGA earnings respectively. Let Xi denote a
vector of migrant characteristics, including worker and household controls from Table 1. Let
Zd denote a vector of trip characteristics, including those from Table 2, as well as crime and
pollution levels at destination (see Appendix A for more detail). Let µS denote state ﬁxed
eﬀects. We estimate the following regression through probit, with standard errors clustered
at the village level:
Did = αm log(w
i
m) + αg log(w
i
g) + βXi + δZd + µS + εid
Table 7 presents the probit estimates (marginal eﬀects at the mean). As expected, we
ﬁnd that migrants who had higher earnings were less likely to want NREGA work, which is
consistent with the evidence presented above. NREGA earnings, which show little variation
across individuals, have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on demand for NREGA work. Two worker char-
acteristics have signiﬁcant eﬀects: education and age. The relationship between NREGA
demand and education is non-linear: migrants with primary education were more likely to
want NREGA work than workers with no education, but migrants with secondary education
were less likely to want NREGA work. This may be due to the fact that the non-monetary
costs of migration are more important than the monetary gains for more educated workers,
but that workers who have the highest level of education have better employment oppor-
tunities than the NREGA (as appendix Table A.2 shows). The disutility of migration also
increases with age: migrants above 30 are more likely to want NREGA work. Only one
household characteristic has a signiﬁcant eﬀect: the disutility of migration was higher for
migrants from households who have electricity at home, which may make time in the village
more productive / attractive. Finally, turning to the eﬀect of trip and destination charac-
teristics we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of prices at destination on demand for NREGA work
(the estimate is positive and large but noisy). Since 86% of migrants slept on the worksite
(see Table 2), there is not much variation to study the role of housing conditions. We ﬁnd
mixed evidence on the role of destination amenities at destination do matter: the utility cost
of migration was lower among migrants who went to an urban area, but was higher among
those who went to a destination where crime levels were relatively high. The level of air
pollution does not seem to inﬂuence migrant choices, which is perhaps due to the fact that
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construction workers are exposed to high level of particle matter on site anyway.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides new evidence on the costs and beneﬁts of migration in developing coun-
tries. We study seasonal migration, which provides a unique opportunity to observe the
same worker doing similar work in the village and in the city in the same season. Our anal-
ysis relies on original survey data from a high out-migration area in three Indian states and
proceeds in two steps. First, we show that when employment is available on local public
works, rural workers shorten their migration trips or stop migrating altogether. This is de-
spite the fact that migrants' earnings per day outside of the village are much higher than
daily earnings from the program. Second, we use a simple structural model and individual
information on migration and public works earnings to quantify the utility cost of migration
implied by the preference of a majority of migrants for public works. We estimate that the
ﬂow cost of migration needs to be as high as 60% of daily earnings away from the village. In
the last part of the paper, we attempt to quantify the diﬀerent components of this cost. Us-
ing destination-speciﬁc deﬂators and appropriate consumption baskets, we show that higher
living costs may only explain up to 18% of the cost of migration. We also measure income
risk as variation in migration earnings across repeated migration spells for the same migrant,
and ﬁnd that even assuming high levels of risk aversion, income risk can only explain up to
27% of migration costs. The remaining 55% likely reﬂect non-monetary costs of harsh living
and working conditions in the city and the non-monetary value of staying in the village. We
show that these costs are higher for older migrants, for migrants who come from households
with electricity at home, and migrants who go to areas where crime levels are higher.
Our results provide a useful complement to Bryan et al. (2014) experimental ﬁndings on
seasonal migration in Bangladesh. Bryan et al. (2014) ﬁnd that a small transport subsidy
durably increases migration to the city. They argue that net beneﬁts of short-term migration
are large, but that rural workers lack information about urban employment opportunities
and / or are too risk averse to migrate. By contrast, in the context of our study, workers
are well informed of migration opportunities, but decide to stay back when employment
is available locally, even for a much lower pay. We show that income risk is only part of
the explanation. Hence, while rural workers may reap large monetary gains from migrating
temporarily to the city, they also incur sizeable costs, many of which are non-monetary. In
fact, in a recent re-evaluation of the initial Bangladesh experiment, Lagakos et al. (2018)
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also argue that the welfare gains from migration subsidies may be limited by a large non-
monetary cost of migration.
Our ﬁndings have important implications for development policy. On the one hand, many
governments consider that migration has undesirable eﬀects for the migrants themselves, for
their communities of origin or their city (or country) of destination, and promote development
at origin as an alternative to migration. Oﬀering an alternative to migration was one of
the motivation for the NREGA legislation (Ashish and Bhatia, 2009). In a diﬀerent context,
the new European Fund for Sustainable Development's main objective is to tackle the root
causes of migration from Africa (European Parliament, 2017). Our results suggest that
policies aimed at reducing migration ﬂows do not need to fully compensate workers for the
loss in potential migration earnings to convince them to stay at home. On the other hand,
economists tend to argue that governments should in fact encourage mobility to urban areas,
which would improve the allocation of labor in the economy (Gollin et al., 2014; Kraay and
McKenzie, 2014; Bryan and Morten, 2015). Our results suggest that improving working and
living conditions for migrants in urban areas may go a long way towards this aim.
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Figure 1: Cross-state variation in public employment provision
Figure 2: Seasonality of public employment provision
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Figure 3: Seasonal out-migration rates in India and in the survey sample
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Table 1: Village Characteristics
RJ MP St. Diff. RJ GJ St. Diff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Matching variables
Population Share Scheduled Castes 0% 1% 0.09 1% 0% 0.53
Population Share Scheduled Tribes 96% 96% 0.01 98% 99% 0.43
Total culturable land 161 161 0.00 250 235 0.09
% culturable land irrigated 25% 25% 0.01 31% 27% 0.20
% culturable land non irrigated 59% 59% 0.02 57% 50% 0.30
Population per ha of culturable land 3.5 3.5 0.00 5.7 5.6 0.01
Panel B: Village controls
Total Population 755 802 0.09 1815 1642 0.16
% Population Literate 37% 31% 0.48 39% 46% 0.94
Approach with paved road? 84% 76% 0.20 100% 100% 0.00
Bus Service? 0.28 0.24 0.09 0.30 1.00 1.43
Post and telecommunication facility? 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.40 0.10 0.68
Distance to Town (km) 26.20 38.04 0.68 43.40 16.60 1.20
Panel C: Household controls
Number of Adults 4.69 4.85 0.18 4.46 5.58 1.01
Number of Children (below 12) 2.87 3.09 0.26 2.62 2.85 0.27
% Hindu 91% 80% 0.84 88% 77% 0.70
% Scheduled Tribes 89% 91% 0.07 85% 92% 0.29
% HH with dirt floor 91% 96% 0.41 81% 84% 0.16
% HH with cell phone 35% 33% 0.09 33% 55% 0.99
% HH with electricity 23% 33% 0.38 22% 57% 0.99
% HH whose main income source is farming 0.57 0.55 0.09 0.42 0.42 0.00
Panel D: Worker controls
% Female 53% 53% 0.08 55% 50% 0.81
% Primary Education 16% 11% 0.73 11% 11% 0.06
% Education Beyond Primary 15% 10% 0.55 17% 37% 1.25
% Age between 30 and 45 28% 25% 0.30 25% 29% 0.38
% Age higher than 45 27% 31% 0.47 28% 30% 0.22
% Married 72% 76% 0.42 72% 72% 0.07
% Speaks Gujarati 5% 7% 0.21 11% 100% 1.89
% Speaks Hindi 35% 40% 0.24 26% 26% 0.01
Number of villages 25 25 10 10
MP-RJ Pairs GJ-RJ Pairs
Matching variables are from the Census 2001. Village characteristics are from the Census 2011, household 
and worker characteristics are from the 2010 survey. The following acronyms are used for state names: RJ 
for Rajasthan, MP for Madhya Pradesh and GJ for Gujarat. Differences are normalized, i.e. divided by the 
standard deviation of the covariate in the sample. The literature considers a difference of more than 0.25 
standard deviations as substantial (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). All village, household and worker 
characteristics listed in this table are included as control in our main specification.
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Table 2: Migration patterns
Summer 
2009
Monsoon 
2009
Winter 2009-
10 All India
Sample 
districts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Migrated? 35% 10% 29% 3% 16%
Observations (whole sample) 2224 2224 2224 188324 1937
Migrant is female 40% 33% 43% 14% 32%
Migrated with household member 71% 63% 74% 42% 81%
Destination is in same state 17% 27% 24% 53% 82%
Destination is urban 84% 88% 73% 68% 71%
Worked in construction 70% 70% 56% 42% 69%
Distance (km) 300 445 286 - -
Transportation cost (Rs) 116 144 107 - -
Duration (days) 54 52 49 - -
Found employer after leaving 63% 64% 54% - -
No formal shelter in destination 86% 85% 83% - -
Days worked per week spent at destination 6.06 5.95 6.10 - -
Earnings per day worked at destination 118 127 123 - -
Earnings per day spent at destination 101 107 109
  
Observations (migrants only) 768 218 646 13411 327
Notes: Columns 1 to 3 present means based on the migration survey described in Section 2. The unit of 
observation is a prime-age adult. Each column restricts the sample to responses for a particular season. Seasons 
are defined as follows: summer from April to June, monsoon from July to November, winter from December to 
March. Columns 4 and 5 present means based on the National Sample Survey (NSS). In Column 4 the sample 
includes all rural adults. In Column 5 the sample is restricted to adults living in the four districts of the migration 
survey sample. Information on distance, migration duration, transportation cost, job search and accommodation at 
destination is not collected by the NSS.
Own survey NSS 2007-08
30
Table 3: Eﬀect of NREGA on Seasonal Migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All village pairs
Rajasthan -0.117 -0.388 -1.177 1.236 -0.0114 0.0201
(0.183) (0.419) (1.671) (1.266) (0.0232) (0.0163)
Summer (March-July) 5.982*** 5.982*** 13.30*** 13.30*** 0.187*** 0.187***
(0.802) (0.806) (1.746) (1.753) (0.0209) (0.0210)
Rajasthan x Summer 8.990*** 8.990*** -5.503** -5.503** -0.0703** -0.0703**
(1.128) (1.133) (2.203) (2.213) (0.0268) (0.0269)
Observations 6,588 6,588 6,588 6,588 6,588 6,588
Control Mean .67 .67 10.69 10.69 .2 .2
Panel B: Excluding pairs with Gujarat
Rajasthan -0.231 0.0319 -0.381 -0.534 -0.000557 0.00825
(0.220) (0.452) (1.827) (1.462) (0.0256) (0.0197)
Summer (March-July) 7.606*** 7.606*** 17.24*** 17.24*** 0.233*** 0.233***
(0.895) (0.900) (1.918) (1.927) (0.0226) (0.0228)
Rajasthan x Summer 7.408*** 7.408*** -8.640*** -8.640*** -0.107*** -0.107***
(1.281) (1.288) (2.570) (2.583) (0.0301) (0.0303)
Observations 4,677 4,677 4,677 4,677 4,677 4,677
Control Mean .85 .85 8.77 8.77 .18 .18
Worker Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Village Pair Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes
The unit of observation is an adult in a given season.  Results in Panel B are based on pairs of villages in Madhya Pradesh 
and Rajasthan only. Column 1 and 2 present results from a regression of days spent working on the NREGA during a 
particular season on a set of explanatory variables. In Column 3 and 4 the outcome is the number of days spent away for 
work. In Column 5 and 6 the outcome is a binary variable equal to one if the adult spent some time away for work during a 
particular season. Rajasthan is a dummy for whether the adult lives within a village in Rajasthan. Summer is a dummy for 
the summer months (mid-March to mid-July). Control Mean is the mean of the outcome variable in villages which are not 
in Rajasthan outside of the summer months. Standard errors are clustered at the village-level.  ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. 
NREGA Days Days away Any migration
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Table 4: Migration Cost Estimates
All Non-missing migration Earnings
Did NREGA work 
during the season
Days away > 
NREGA days 
wanted 
NREGA days 
wanted > Days in 
the village   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean Migration Cost 60.0 60.3 64.9 47.0 47.3
[54.8,65.2] [54.9,66.3] [58.1,72] [39.1,55.3] [37.2,57.5]
Standard Deviation 36.8 40.5 33.9 39.7 40.4
[33.2,41.4] [35.9,45.3] [27.4,41.2] [34.9,49.5] [35.5,52.4]
Daily Migration Earnings 102.5 103.5 104.5 105.5 106.5
Cost as % of Earnings 58.6% 58.3% 62.1% 44.6% 44.4%
Observations 768 568 267 343 350
The unit of observation is an adult. The first and second rows present estimates of the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of 
migration costs per day spent outside the village. Confidence intervals are computed by bootstrap clustered at the village level. Column 
1 uses the full sample of adults who left the village during the summer 2009. Column 2 includes only migrants for whom migration 
earnings are measured for that season. Column 3 includes only migrants who have done NREGA work during the summer 2009. 
Column 4 includes only migrants who report wanting less days of NREGA work than the number of days they were away. Column 5 
includes only migrants who report wanting more NREGA work days than the days they spent in the village during the summer 2009. 
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Table 5: Migration Cost Estimates taking Living Costs into Account
Nominal            
(all migrants)
Nominal       
(destination is 
known)
Deflated 
(including all 
expenditures)
Deflated 
(excluding 
housing and 
school fees)
Deflated (food 
expenditures 
only)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean Migration Cost 60.0 59.9 36.0 49.0 56.1
[54.7,65.6] [53.9,65.8] [30.9,41.4] [43.7,55.1] [50.5,61.5]
Standard Deviation 36.8 39.1 30.8 35.1 37.3
[33.5,41.2] [34,43.7] [27.6,34.8] [31.5,39.1] [33.5,41.6]
Daily Migration Earnings 102.5 103.5 104.5 105.5 106.5
Costs as % of Earnings 58.6% 57.8% 34.4% 46.5% 52.6%
Observations 768 592 592 592 592
The unit of observation is an adult. The first and second rows present estimates of the mean and standard deviation of the 
distribution of migration costs per day spent outside the village. Confidence intervals are computed by bootstrap 
clustered at the village level. In column 1, the sample is composed of all adults who left the village during the summer 
2009. In columns 2 to 4 it only includes migrants whose destination is known. In column 3 migration earnings are 
deflated using the ratio between the urban poverty line of the state of destination and the average rural poverty line in 
Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. In column 4 the ratio of poverty lines is applied only to an adjusted basket, 
which excludes housing expenditures and school fees. In column 5 it is only applied to food expenditures.
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Table 6: Risk Premium Calibration
Risk Aversion Parameter Risk Premium (% of Migration Earnings)
Panel A: Binswanger (1980)'s Z
0.33 8%
0.5 12%
0.66 16%
0.8 20%
Panel B: Constant Relative Risk Aversion
1 3%
2 6%
3 9%
4 12%
5 16%
This table displays results of a calibration of the implied risk premium (as a percentage of 
migration earnings) given the standard deviation of migration earnings and a risk 
aversion parameter. The standard deviation is estimated as the variation in earnings for 
the same individual migrating in the same season (March to July) across two consecutive 
years (2009 and 2010). In panel A the risk aversion parameter is the ratio of changes in 
expected earnings divided by changes in the standard deviation of earnings (Z). Based on 
experimental games with Indian farmers, Binswanger (1980) finds that less than 2.5% of 
respondents have Z higher than 0.8. In panel B the risk aversion parameter is a standard 
risk aversion, assuming Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility.
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Table 7: Determinants of Migration Costs
Coefficient Standard Error
Log Migration Wage -0.0836** (0.0349)
Log NREGA Wage -0.0478 (0.0496)
Female -0.0125 (0.0224)
Primary education 0.0511*** (0.0175)
Education beyond primary -0.159** (0.0695)
Age 30 to 45 0.0551*** (0.0175)
Age higher than 45 0.0279 (0.0350)
Married 0.00101 (0.0263)
Speaks Gujarati -0.0182 (0.0408)
Speaks Hindi -0.0243 (0.0354)
Number of adults 0.00941 (0.00575)
Number of Children (below 12) -0.00567 (0.00516)
Hindu 0.00586 (0.0362)
Scheduled Tribes 0.0813 (0.0497)
HH has dirt floor -0.0162 (0.0281)
HH has cell phone -0.0323 (0.0211)
HH has electricity 0.0725*** (0.0230)
HH main income source is farming 0.0247 (0.0214)
Log Destination  Deflator 0.162 (0.231)
Migrated with Household -0.0159 (0.0227)
Destination is in same state 0.0295 (0.0289)
Destination is urban -0.0693*** (0.0206)
Worked in construction 0.0107 (0.0275)
Found employer after leaving 0.0221 (0.0247)
No formal shelter at destination -0.0142 (0.0308)
Total crime per 1000 0.198** (0.0804)
Pollution SPM µg per m3 -0.0447 (0.0428)
Observations 592
State of Origin FE Yes
The unit of observation is an adult. The sample includes only adults who were interviewed personally 
and migrated in the summer 2009. We report marginal effects at the mean from a separate probit 
estimation. The outcome is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent said they would have liked 
to do more NREGA work during the summer 2009.  Worker controls and Household controls are 
described in Table 1. Trip characteristics are described in Table 2. The city deflator is the ratio of the 
urban poverty line in the state of destination to the average of rural poverty lines in Rajasthan, Madhya 
Pradesh and Gujarat. Crime per 1000 is computed using the National Crime Records Bureau report in 
the state of destination for 2009. Pollution is measured as Suspended Particle Matter per cubic meter, 
which is reported at the city level by the Central Pollution Control Board for the year 2010. Standard 
errors are clustered at the village-level.  ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level. 
Want more NREGA work?
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FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION ONLY
A Appendix
A.1 Construction of Earnings Variables
Migration Earnings The survey instrument included questions about the frequency of
payment and the typical amount per pay period. In most cases (74%), respondents were
paid daily and in these cases we used the typical daily payment as earnings per day worked.
We also asked respondents how many days per week they typically worked. Respondents
worked on average six days per week and the median respondent worked six days. For
respondents who were paid weekly, fortnightly, or monthly, we used the reported payment
adjusted by the typical number of days per week worked. For example, a migrant paid 800
rupees weekly and working six days per week earns 800/6 = 133 rupees per day worked.
For migrants that were paid irregularly or in one lump sum at the end of work, we used
the total earnings from the trip divided by the number of days worked. For migrants with
missing values of days worked per week, we assumed they worked six days. Five percent
of respondents received payment in-kind for their work, being paid in wheat for example.
We leave these daily earnings observations as missing. For respondents with non-missing
total earnings (62%), earnings per day away was computed using total earnings divided by
days away. For respondents with missing total earnings, we used earnings per day worked
adjusted downwards using days worked per week away.
As discussed in Section 2.2, the survey recorded detailed information on the last four
trips only. Hence for adults who migrated in the summer 2009 but took more than four trips
afterward, we did not record information for any of the trips taken during summer 2009.
Out of 768 migrants, we have non-missing earnings for 593 migrants (77%). For migrants
with missing earnings, we construct linear predictions by projecting summer 2009 earnings
onto migration earnings in the following seasons (monsoon 2009, winter 2009 and summer
2010), individual and household controls (the list of controls is the same as in Panel C and
D of Table 1. The regression coeﬃcients are shown in appendix Table A.5. The mean of the
observed and the predicted migration earnings are Rs. 101 and Rs. 102 respectively, which
provides reassurance that the migrants with missing earnings are very similar to the other
migrants in terms of observable characteristics.
NREGA Earnings Out of the 895 adults who worked for the NREGA during summer
2009, 32 (3.6%) report not having been paid in full at the time of the survey. Assuming a
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wage of zero for those who were not paid yields a wage of 64.4 rupees per day compared with
67 for only those who were paid. For our estimation of migration costs, we need a measure of
daily earnings on NREGA that non-NREGA participants would expect to receive. For this,
we restrict our sample to the 238 adults who both migrated and did NREGA work in the
summer 2009 and we regress NREGA earnings on NREGA daily earnings for the following
season, individual and worker controls (see Panel C and D in Table 1). The regression esti-
mates are shown in appendix Table A.5. Interestingly, none of the predictors except summer
2010 NREGA daily earnings are statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that the NREGA wage
does not vary with productivity or observable characteristics. The R-square of the regression
is low, about 14%. In contrast, the R-square for the prediction of migration earnings is 27%.
We use these estimates to predict NREGA earnings for migrants who did not participate to
the program in the summer 2009. Again, mean predicted earnings are extremely close to
observed earnings, Rs. 65 and Rs. 66 respectively.
A.2 Destination Characteristics
In order to better understand the determinants of migrants' demand or NREGA work, we
use several sources of information on their destination.
Poverty lines First, we use poverty lines from (Planning Commission, 2009) to compute
deﬂators of migration earnings. Speciﬁcally, we compute the ratio of the urban poverty line
in the state of destination divided by the average of the rural poverty line in the three sample
states (Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat).
Crime Second, we use information on total crime per 1000 inhabitants in the state of
destination in 2009 from the National Crime Records Bureau. We thank Nishith Prakash
for sharing the data (Prakash et al., 2014).
Pollution Third, we use an index of urban air pollution at the state level in 2010, Suspended
Particle Matter per cubic meter reported by the Central Pollution Control Board. We thank
Anant Sudarshan for sharing the data (Greenstone et al., 2015).
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Figure A.1: Destinations of migrants from the survey sample in the summer 2009
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Figure A.2: Diﬀerences in seasonal migration across states using retrospective questions
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Table A.1: Migration Survey Sample
All Adults
Full Adult 
Survey 
Completed
Adult Survey 
not 
Completed
Difference      
(3) - (2)
All Adults 
(India)
All Adults 
(Sample 
Districts)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5)
Female 0.511 0.525 0.448 -0.077 0.499 0.492
(0.0056) (0.0166) (0.0067) (0.019) (0.0011) (0.0076)
Married 0.704 0.729 0.594 -0.134 0.720 0.753
(0.0091) (0.021) (0.0105) (0.0233) (0.0019) (0.0185)
Illiterate 0.672 0.690 0.593 -0.097 0.372 0.491
(0.0187) (0.0327) (0.019) (0.03) (0.003) (0.0313)
Scheduled Tribe 0.897 0.894 0.910 0.016 0.106 0.660
(0.0272) (0.0278) (0.0287) (0.0225) (0.0033) (0.0601)
Age 32.8 34.1 27.0 -7.11 32.7 31.6
(0.248) (0.484) (0.301) (0.592) (0.038) (0.3508)
Spent 2-330 days away for work 0.433 0.422 0.482 0.060 -- --
(0.0179) (0.0394) (0.0187) (0.0412)
Migrated for Work all Three Seasons 0.119 0.080 0.295 0.215 -- --
(0.011) (0.0318) (0.0101) (0.0324)
Ever Worked for NREGA 0.528 0.581 0.291 -0.290 -- --
(0.0253) (0.0354) (0.0259) (0.0332)
Spent 30-180 days away for work 0.301 0.312 0.251 -0.061 0.028 0.170
(0.0159) (0.0351) (0.0166) (0.0362) (0.0009) (0.0366)
Adults 2,722 2,224 498 188,324 1,937
Own Survey NSS Survey 2007-08
The unit of observation is an adult. Standard errors computed assuming correlation of errors at the village level in parentheses. 
The first four columns present means based on subsets of the adults aged 14 to 69 from the main data set discussed in the 
paper. The first column includes the full sample of persons aged 14 to 69 for whom the adult survey was attempted. The 
second column includes all persons aged 14 to 69 for which the full adult survey was completed. The third column includes 
all persons aged 14 to 69 for which the full adult survey was not completed. The fourth column presents the difference 
between the third and second columns. The fifth and sixth columns present means computed using all adults aged 14 to 69 in 
the  rural sample of the NSS Employment and Unemployment survey Round 64 conducted between July 2007 and June 2008 
for all of India and for the six sample districts respectively. Means from the NSS survey are constructed using sampling 
weights. "--" denotes not available.
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Table A.2: Reasons of demand for NREGA work
(1) (2) (3)
Female -0.0286* -0.0272 -0.0107
(0.0165) (0.0167) (0.0172)
Primary Education -0.0545* -0.0448 -0.0385
(0.0301) (0.0290) (0.0288)
Education Beyond Primary -0.167*** -0.143*** -0.121***
(0.0380) (0.0367) (0.0346)
Age 30 to 45 0.0486** 0.0560** 0.0679***
(0.0226) (0.0220) (0.0219)
Age higher than 45 -0.0941*** -0.0871*** -0.0476
(0.0320) (0.0320) (0.0306)
Married 0.0891*** 0.0941*** 0.0831***
(0.0221) (0.0220) (0.0222)
Speaks Gujarati -0.00102 0.000789 -0.0177
(0.0381) (0.0381) (0.0396)
Speaks Hindi -0.0403 -0.0395 -0.0365
(0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0249)
Salaried Job -0.279*** -0.250***
(0.0808) (0.0787)
Migrated 0.0882***
(0.0203)
Observations 2,224 2,224 2,224
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Want more NREGA Work?
The unit of observation is an adult. Each column reports marginal effects at 
the means from a separate probit estimation. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable for whether the individual reports willingness to work more 
days for the NREGA during the summer 2009 if work were available. ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Standard errors are 
clustered at the village level. 
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Table A.3: Migration and NREGA Work
Gujarat Madhya 
Pradesh
Rajasthan Whole 
Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Summer (March-July 2009)
Worked for NREGA 10% 39% 50% 40%
NREGA days worked if participated 25.3 21.7 31.7 28.1
Would have done more NREGA work 78% 79% 81% 80%
Days of NREGA work desired 48.7 41.4 44.3 43.9
Migrated 34% 41% 30% 35%
Migrated and worked for NREGA 2% 15% 13% 12%
Would have migrated if no NREGA work 3% 8% 10% 8%
Migrated and would do more NREGA work 30% 36% 26% 30%
Panel B: Monsoon (July-November 2009)
Worked for NREGA 0% 0% 1% 0%
NREGA days worked if participated 0.0 13.5 29.7 26.1
Would have done more NREGA work 63% 50% 53% 54%
Days of NREGA work desired 27.4 17.9 22.1 21.5
Migrated 18% 7% 9% 10%
Migrated and worked for NREGA 0% 0% 0% 0%
Would have migrated if no NREGA work 0% 0% 0% 0%
Migrated and would do more NREGA work 13% 5% 7% 7%
Panel C: Winter (November 2009-March 2010)
Worked for NREGA 2% 10% 5% 6%
NREGA days worked if participated 21.5 16.1 20.1 18.0
Would have done more NREGA work 75% 74% 76% 75%
Days of NREGA work desired 45.5 36.4 46.0 42.7
Migrated 35% 28% 28% 29%
Migrated and worked for NREGA 1% 3% 1% 2%
Would have migrated if no NREGA work 1% 2% 1% 2%
Migrated and would do more NREGA work 30% 24% 25% 25%
Adults 330 749 1145 2224
Source: Retrospective questions from the 2010 survey. The unit of observation is an adult. 
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Table A.4: Eﬀect of the NREGA on Seasonal Migration (All Adults)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All village pairs
Rajasthan -0.0885 -0.420 -3.940** -1.365 -0.0425 -0.00455
(0.165) (0.389) (1.954) (1.279) (0.0258) (0.0157)
Summer (March-July) 5.569*** 5.569*** 12.13*** 12.13*** 0.168*** 0.168***
(0.776) (0.779) (1.686) (1.692) (0.0197) (0.0198)
Rajasthan x Summer 8.235*** 8.235*** -4.380* -4.380* -0.0571** -0.0571**
(1.043) (1.047) (2.197) (2.205) (0.0253) (0.0254)
Observations 7,779 7,779 7,779 7,779 7,779 7,779
Control Mean 0.60 0.60 15.21 15.21 0.25 0.25
Worker Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Village Pair Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel B: Excluding pairs with Gujarat
Rajasthan -0.203 -0.178 -3.003 -3.344** -0.0248 -0.0178
(0.202) (0.440) (1.983) (1.272) (0.0274) (0.0173)
Summer (March-July) 7.127*** 7.127*** 16.13*** 16.13*** 0.213*** 0.213***
(0.905) (0.909) (1.826) (1.834) (0.0218) (0.0219)
Rajasthan x Summer 6.779*** 6.779*** -7.260*** -7.260*** -0.0904*** -0.0904***
(1.245) (1.250) (2.533) (2.544) (0.0287) (0.0288)
Observations 5,445 5,445 5,445 5,445 5,445 5,445
Control Mean .77 .77 12.47 12.47 .21 .21
Worker Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Village Pair Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes No Yes
NREGA Days Days away Any migration trip
The unit of observation is an adult in a given season. The sample includes adults which were not interviewed 
personally but for whom NREGA work and migration days have been reported by the household head. Results 
in Panel B are based on pairs of villages in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan only. Column One and Two 
presents results from a regression of days spent working on the NREGA during a particular season on a set of 
explanatory variables. In Column Three and Four the outcome is the number of days spent away for work. In 
Column Five and Six the outcome is a binary variable equal to one if the adult spent some time away for work 
during a particular season. Rajasthan is a dummy for whether the adult lives within a village in Rajasthan. 
Summer is a dummy for the summer months (mid-March to mid-July). Control Mean is the mean of the 
outcome variable in villages which are not in Rajasthan outside of the summer months.  Standard errors are 
clustered at the village level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. 
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Table A.5: Predictions of Migration and NREGA Earnings in the Summer 2009
Migration 
earnings
Migration 
earnings
NREGA 
earnings
NREGA 
earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No earnings observed in summer 2010 38.78*** 36.74*** 20.55*** 16.60**
(7.194) (7.121) (6.324) (6.957)
Daily earnings in summer 2010 0.317*** 0.298*** 0.295*** 0.242***
(0.0582) (0.0563) (0.0800) (0.0882)
No earnings observed in winter 2009-10 17.37*** 17.03*** 6.206 4.372
(6.056) (5.993) (8.201) (8.140)
Daily earnings in winter 2009-10 0.152*** 0.137*** 0.00620 -0.0179
(0.0525) (0.0514) (0.0907) (0.0917)
No earnings observed in monsoon 2009 3.546 3.191 - -
(9.832) (9.343)
Daily earnings in monsoon 2009 0.0726 0.0780 0.105 0.0697
(0.0667) (0.0596) (0.189) (0.200)
Observations 568 568 238 238
Worker and Household Controls No Yes No Yes
R-Square 0.243 0.272 0.048 0.106
Mean observed earnings 101 65
Mean predicted earnings 102 66
The unit of observation is an adult. The sample is restricted to the 768 respondents who declared 
having migrated in the summer 2009. In Column 1 and 2, the sample includes only migrants for whom 
migration earnings during the summer 2009 are known. In Column 3 and 4 the sample includes only 
migrants who did NREGA work during the summer 2009. In Column 1 and 2 the variables "No 
earnings observed" and "Daily earnings" refer to migration earnings. In Column 3 and 4 they refer to 
NREGA earnings. Columns 2 and 4 include worker and household controls described in Table 1. The 
coefficient on "No earnings observed in the monsoon 2009" is missing in Column 3 and 4 because 
only there are too few (two) migrants who worked for NREGA during the monsoon 2009 to identify it. 
In Column 2 and 4 "Mean observed earnings" is the mean of the dependent variable for the regression 
sample, and "Mean predicted earnings" is the mean of the linear prediction based on regression 
estimates for all 768 migrants. Standard errors are clustered at the village-level.  ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. 
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Table A.6: Earnings Diﬀerentials between Migration and NREGA work
Migrated
Migrated and 
Want More 
NREGA Work
Migrated and Do 
not Want More 
NREGA Work
Migrated and 
Worked for 
NREGA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Earnings per Day Outside Village 102.2 100.2 116.4 100.3
(2.22) (2.06) (7.19) (3.06)
(2) Earnings per Day of NREGA Work 66.7 66.6 67.4 66.4
(0.73) (0.79) (0.8) (1.73)
(3) Difference (1) - (2) 35.5 33.6 49.0 33.9
(2.19) (2.03) (7.27) (3.26)
Observations 768 672 96 267
The unit of observation is an adult. The first row presents the mean earnings per day outside the village during summer 
2009 for different subsets of all migrants. For adults with missing earnings, earnings from migration trips taken during 
summer 2010 are used to predict earnings in summer 2009. The second row presents the mean of earnings per day worked 
for NREGA during summer 2009. For adults who did not work for NREGA or have missing earnings, earnings are 
predicted using summer 2010 NREGA earnings and a set of person-level characteristics. Standard errors computed 
assuming correlation of errors within villages in parentheses.
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Table A.7: Cross-state comparison of permanent migration in the last ﬁve years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: All village pairs
Rajasthan 0.0324 0.0400 0.0937 -0.0601
(0.0369) (0.0308) (0.181) (0.139)
Observations 702 702 702 702
Mean in Control .39 .39 1.23 1.23
Panel B: Excluding pairs with Gujarat
Rajasthan 0.0347 0.0529 0.112 0.0561
(0.0463) (0.0386) (0.216) (0.159)
Observations 503 503 503 503
Mean in Control .4 .4 1.24 1.24
Household and Village Controls No Yes No Yes
Village Pair Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes
The unit of observation is a household.  Results in Panel B are based on pairs of villages 
in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan only. In Column 1 and 2 the dependent variable a a 
dummy which equals one if any member of the household left within the past five years. 
In Column 3 and 4 it is the number of household members who left within the past five 
years. Controls include village and household  controls presented in Table 1. Mean in 
Control is the average outcome in non-Rajasthan villages. Standard errors are clustered at 
the village level. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
Any Migrant Number of Migrants
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